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A policy bubble is a policy overreaction that is reinforced by positive feedback over a relatively long period
of time. Policy bubbles impose social costs without producing offsetting benefits. Moshe
Maor explores this phenomenon and explains how it may mature as a result of over-optimism and
overconfidence among policymakers and the general public, or as a result of human
herding and emotional contagion. 
Policy scholars and practitioners claim that the Eurozone has been, and still is, a policy bubble akin
to similar well-known suspecte policy bubbles like privatisation, nuclear deterrence, New Public
Management (NPM) success in cutting costs, state-private partnership in the delivery of long term infrastructure
projects, and the idea of sustainability. In order to prepare the conceptual ground  to address this claim,  I have
tried to abstract out the most relevant features of a policy bubble by directing attention to the process that
leads policymakers and the general public to misassign value to public policies over a relatively long period of time.
Which factors drive the emergence of a gap between the (actual or perceived) cost of a policy and its (actual or
perceived) contribution to its goals?
A public policy  may be valued or devalued for reasons that are unrelated to its ability to affect goals. This is due, for
example, to the use of rational and political considerations in policy evaluation, with the latter considerations often
weakly related or completely unrelated to the policy goals. The empirical and theoretical neglect of this gap may be
related to the fact that public policy scholars have so far been quite happy with the thermostat model, which
suggests that the public functions like a common thermostat—it modifies its preferences for more spending
downwards when budget appropriations increase and prefer increased spending when appropriations
decrease. The problem is that the thermostat model only describes what occurs ‘on average’. Missing is an account
of policies that fall at the extremes of the policy continuum, especially those whose development indicate a role for
socio-psychological factors, as well as emotional and neurological ones.
A policy bubble is a real or perceived policy overreaction that is reinforced by positive feedback over
a relatively long period of time. This type of policy imposes objective and/or perceived social costs without producing
offsetting objective and/or perceived benefits over a considerable length of time. A case in point is  when government
spending over a policy problem increases due to public demand for more policy  while the severity of the problem
decreases over an extended period of time.  Another case is when government raises ‘green’ or other standards due
to public demand while the severity of the problem does not justify this move.
This is not to say that policy bubbles are always harmful. Some may indeed be harmful, but others may be
significantly beneficial. A good example of the harmful consequences of a policy bubble is China’s Great Leap
Forward in 1958-1961, during which agricultural collectivisation and aggressive promotion of industry was achieved
through a swift diversion of agricultural labour and resources to industry, but which subsequently resulted in a
famine that killed tens of millions. On the other hand, the railway mania in Britain during the 1840s that led to
the vast expansion of the British railway system during the speculative investment period  is a prime example of a
beneficial policy bubble.
Drawing on insights from a variety of fields – including behavioural economics, psychology, sociology, political
science and public policy – three phases of the life-cycle of a policy bubble  may be identified: birth, maturity and
death. A policy bubble may emerge when certain individuals perceive opportunities to gain from public policy or
to exploit it by rallying support for the policy, promoting word-of-mouth enthusiasm and widespread endorsement of
the policy, heightening expectations for further policy, and increasing demand for this policy. In particular, they stand
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to gain more if they find other individuals who act similarly. If that is the case, an oversupply of this policy is likely to
follow. If this process is sustained over an extended period of time, a policy bubble may emerge. A policy bubble
may also emerge when people are emotionally attracted to certain aspects of the policy, especially when the
emotional quality of the policy idea matches the mood of the population. Policy bubbles arise, therefore, by way of
‘mobilisation of enthusiasm’ when the policy enacted exceeds its ability to affect policy goals.
A policy bubble grows and matures when positive feedback processes enter into the fray. Bursts of public optimism,
for example, may encourage trend-chasers to subscribe to the policy, further arousing individuals’ enthusiasm,  which
then leads to oversupply of the policy at hand. By the same token, the reputation of a policy that is known for
increasing efficiency (e.g., privatisation and contracting out) can be self-perpetuating. Such a reputation may be built
on solid ground, but it may also lack solid footing and be based on past performances  that are no longer
valid, rumour or misconception. This implies that the trigger for the policy trend may be purely random, negligible,
unstable or weak.
A policy bubble may mature as a result of over-optimism and overconfidence among policymakers and/or the
general public, or as a result of imitation and human herding, as well as emotional contagion. Emotional
entrepreneurs may play an important role in this process, trying to modify people’s emotions regarding the policy or
the politicians that promote it and thereby shaping how people value this public policy. The role of the media in
creating a self-sustained process is of paramount importance because it may overemphasize the value of policy by
intensively reporting positive news regarding the policy and creating an investment culture around it. As long as
there is anticipation for higher policy payoffs, positive feedback of high hopes overcomes negative feedback of
crash expectations. However, since persistent policy payoffs cannot occur forever, elements of diminishing returns,
at some point in time, are bound to replace positive feedback. Policy payoffs are likely to decline, and the bubble
may gradually or abruptly burst. Losses incurred to individuals and to governments alike once the policy bubble
bursts can be severe, sometimes even threatening the stability of the policy and political systems.
How can one identify a policy bubble? A policy bubble may be identified by measuring  parliamentary concerns,
media concerns, public opinion regarding the policy at hand, and the extent of a policy problem, against the budget
allocation to said policy over the same period, preferably over 50 years or more. Measuring the operation of different
transmission mechanisms in emotional contagion and human herding, particularly the spread of social influence and
feeling , can also work to identify a policy bubble. Here, computer-aided content analysis of verbal and non-verbal
communication in social networks, especially instant messaging, may capture emotional and social contagion.  A
further way to identify a policy bubble revolves around studying bubble expectations and individuals’ confidence
through time by distributing a questionnaire to a random sample of the population, experts in the relevant policy
sub-field, as well as decision makers, and to compare the results across time and nations.
To sum up, my interpretation of the process that leads to the emergence of policy bubbles allows for the possibility
that different modes of policy overreaction lead to different types of human herding, thereby resulting in different
types of policy bubbles. This interpretation has the added benefit of contributing to the explanation of economic,
financial, technological and social bubbles as well.
This article is drawn from a paper published in the Governance Journal
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the
London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting. 
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